


# NYSEMA

Mass Gathering Preparation



# NIKA RIOTS, CONSTANTINOPLE HIPPODROME - 592



More than 30,000  
dead.




Nika 5 day riot was a revolt by the people against the Roman Emperor Justinian I, due to a chariot race he held against two fugitives that were members of two factional teams of chariot racing.



# EASTADIO NATIONAL, PERU - 1964

318 Dead, 500 wounded

Pitch invasion in protest of “no goal” led to tear gas and panicked voluntary evacuation. Those who stayed in their seats remained unharmed. Those who left were trapped against closed steel gates.





# LUZHNIKI, SOVIET UNION - 1982

340 dead

Similar to Ibrox disaster, a stampede took place in a Stadium in Moscow near end of game, where mostly Moscow adolescent fans died.

Both stampede instances started with an individual falling at the bottom.




# HEYSEL STADIUM, BELGIUM - 1985



39 dead, 500 + injured

Caused by fan fight and retreat. Yet, game must go on and they played anyway. (1-0)





# HILSBOROUGH STADIUM, UK - 1989

96 dead, 766 injured



Late arriving crowd rushing to get in. Police opened two exit gates and people poured in unregulated, not realizing the crush on those in front.





# STATION NIGHTCLUB FIRE, RHODE ISLAND

2003

100 dead, 230 injured



- Egress blocked by crush
- Crowd retreat to where they enter (3 other exits)
- "Band only exit" blocked by bouncer

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IxiOXZ55hbc>





# LOVE PARADE, GERMANY - 2010

21 dead, 500 injured



Crowd exceeded its capacity and police were not allowing people to enter anymore. The crowd started entering through rear tunnel entrance and the ramps between the tunnels became overcrowded, causing a crush.

- Planners allowed event to exceed size (250K to 1 mill) with no firm restrictions.
- Entrance was a bottleneck






# COORDINATED ATTACKS, PARIS

## 2015

130 Dead



>  
29/35  
<



Victims of a shooting attack lay on the pavement outside La Belle Equipe restaurant in Paris Friday, Nov. 13, 2015. Well over





# ROUTE 91 HARVEST FESTIVAL, LAS VEGAS 2017

58 Dead, 800 + injured





# ROUTE 91 HARVEST FESTIVAL




# EMERGENCY SERVICES PRIORITIES

- Audience participation
  - Have EMS priorities changed?
  - If not, what has changed? The mix of emphasis on active killer
- 
- human intuition/methods (creativity – for ex. Evolution of the IED)
  - human desire (more targets, on line recruitment/teaching, increased hate)
  - human means (tools, technology, availability, audience)






## 2000-2017 Active Shooter Locations 250 Incidents





## 2013-2017 Active Shooter Locations 107 Incidents

**\*\* Almost ½ in last five years**





POP CULTURE OUTREACH





## THE DESIGN

1

- 1 -Implementing and imitating the design carefully. The design can be found in the first issue of Inspire Magazine.
- 2 -the main purpose of the bomb is killing not destroying or demolition, so enough shrapnel should be in the bomb.
- 3 - The shrapnel should be shaped in two layers and be placed into "the pressure cooker" around the inner edges.
- 4 - The best size of one shrapnel is between 10 – 6 mm. and it should be attached together.
- 5 - You can use any type of gunpowder.
- 6 -after filling the pressure cooker with the explosives it should be closed tightly and all the openings should be sealed.



# THE SUCCESSFUL PRESSURE COOKER BOMB

## THE TIME

2

- 1 - It is better to choose the yearly, month or weekly occasions in which there are crowds and large gatherings of people.
- 2 - It is better to choose the most crowded time of the day.
- 3 - It is better to carry out the operation in a time simultaneous with a specific event such as 11\9 anniversary. This will double the political success of the operation.
- 4 - Controlling The Execution Time is by two ways:  
First\ by using a timer, it is not accurate, and should be used in fixed targets such as gathering places at specific time.  
Second\ by using a remote control, this is accurate and used in moving targets such as cars, moving crowds such as marathon race as in the Boston operation.



## THE PLACE

3

- 1 -Select areas where there are large crowds.
- 2 - Waiting and gathering places in which movement of people is minimal.
- 3 - It is better to put the bomb in a place high from the ground half meter and not more than one and half meter.



## CAMOUFLAGE


4

- 1 - Place the bomb in a container not attracting attention, when placed at the exact place of detonation.
- 2 - You can place the bomb in a bag.
- 3 - You can place the bomb in a carton box.





# DOMESTIC TERROR/EXTREMIST GROUPS



**THEREFORE.....**

**What are we to consider when  
planning together as one team  
(EMS, event planners, LE) for an  
event in our AOR?????**





# CONSIDERATIONS - VENUE



Layer 1 – outside  
gates

Layer 2 - gates

Layer 3 – Inside gates

***\*\*What is not of the norm, and then resolve it  
by observation, interaction, or confrontation.***





# CONSIDERATIONS - VENUE

- **CHOKE POINTS** – Not only choke points for mass killing consideration, but also choke points for evacuation consideration.
- **CROWD FLOW PROTECTION** – Barriers to protect those flowing in and out of event. Layer 2 (GATE) security. Paris bomber detonation outside stadium
- **Lesson Learned** – to evacuate or not...Paris President decision, restrictions firm on crowd (upcoming Woodstock), water/facilities for waiting crowd (Air show), Crowd flow to prevent crush (no restrictive barriers)



# CONSIDERATIONS - EVENT

- **H** — History of the event
- **V** — Vulnerability of the specific event (soft/hard)
- **A** — Attractiveness of the event to the killer
- **C** — Culture currently surrounding the event type





# CONSIDERATIONS - CROWD



- Social/political agenda (killers or targets)
- Targets of specificity VS opportunity
- Secure points of entry
- Deterrents
- Code of conduct with enforcement policy



# FBI SEC ROLE...

## Everything left of crisis

- Meetings – effective SE plans are planned to the crisis
- Briefs
- SETA
- Safeguarding
- Known threat sharing
- SMART
- SET – Identify the not normal (potential threat) & resolve (O.I.C.)





# FBI SEC CONSIDERATIONS

- HVAC
- Communications
- Liaison assistance from public
- Training



# CURRENT CONCERNS - DRONES

- FAA – ultimate control of airspace, but most regulations are civil
- 3 mile restriction of events 30K +, one hour before/after
- **TEMPORARY FLIGHT RESTRICTION (TFR):** Restriction on an area of airspace due to the movement of government VIPs, special events (Super Bowl, political conventions), natural disasters, or other unusual events. Level of restriction for each TFR vary.
- Town ordinances
- National Defense Authorization Act (October 2018) -





# UAS AUTHORIZATION

(1) *IN GENERAL.*—The actions authorized in subsection (a) are the following:

- (A) **Detect, identify, monitor, and track the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft without prior consent**, including by means of intercept or other access of a wire communication, an oral communication, or an electronic communication used to control the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.
- (B) **Warn the operator of the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft, including by passive or active, and direct or indirect physical, electronic, radio, and electromagnetic means.**
- (C) **Disrupt control of the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft, without prior consent**, including by disabling the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft by intercepting, interfering, or causing interference with wire, oral, electronic, or radio communications used to control the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.
- (D) **Seize or exercise control of the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.**
- (E) **Seize or otherwise confiscate the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.**
- (F) **Use reasonable force to disable, damage, or destroy the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.**





**Quadrotor UAS**




**Multirotor UAS**




**Agricultural Sprayer UAS**







- Plastic and less detectable
- Cellular or hand gesture control
- Carry a payload of 200G



Super Bowl LIII – 37  
drones (34 resolved)





Homemade

**\$124**





# CURRENT CONCERNS



Even though the context is ISIL, this goal is the intention of all extremist groups.

***“Those looking to do harm are always finding ways to take advantage of vulnerabilities, which requires LEO to continuously assess risk and determine the best ways to protect people and events.” – Gameday Security Magazine***



# LESSON LEARNED LAS VEGAS

- Don't discredit any visual evidence possibilities – Uber, Body cams, Hotels & Venues, Witnesses (Smart Phones), Video production companies called to event (great footage)

**\*\* Nonetheless, all the time stamps contradicted each other, so one uniform time line could not be achieved.**

- Subject was not a gun freak. He started purchasing guns 10 months prior to attack and purchased over 100 weapons. **Family affiliations reported subject had psychological issues and was on meds (Zolof).**
- Subject checked into hotel a week before the attack, and daily hauled up all of his equipment. As a result Vegas hotels do not allow “DO Not Disturb” sign to be up more than 2 days.
- **Packed weapons very carefully so as to not rattle around luggage and set anyone off.**
- Provided massive tips to the bell boys to keep them happy and remove suspicious thoughts (Hotel employees are great safeguard liaison source)
- **First victim was security guard who knocked on door when subject was drilling into the door what was believed to be a gun hole to shoot through. This encounter caused the event to happen before the subject was ready. (Yet – 10 minutes of gunfire followed)**
- Gun jammed once shooting started, killed himself as time slipped away



# LESSONS LEARNED

- **Boston Marathon** – Comm failure
- **Virginia Tech** – traffic jam limiting first responders, and dispatch failure due to more than 2000 incoming calls to a staff of 3.
- **Air Base** – Vehicle with potential explosives. Subject wrongly interviewed in close proximity, too many hovering around vehicle with subject in area. This applies to any vehicle or bag incident (Clear the area).
- **Buffalo Marathon Notifications** – (Bridge stop ex, White Van ex) Comms from event staff to responders. How fast is information generated to right person.
- **Various** - improperly set up EOC, missing key personnel or not by each other.
- **Various** – Disruption contingency planning is too narrow.
- **Various** – “Everyone assumes each other is talking”. MUST MEET and PLAN FACE TO FACE –EC Fair extremist is positive result.







# Federal Bureau of Investigation

## Event Security Related to Mass Gatherings

Each indicator listed below may be, by itself, lawful conduct or behavior and may also constitute the exercise of rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. In addition, there may be a wholly innocent explanation for conduct or behavior that appears suspicious in nature. For this reason, no single indicator should be the sole basis for law enforcement action. The totality of behavioral indicators and other relevant circumstances should be evaluated when considering any law enforcement response or action.

### Basic Guidelines

#### Initial Planning:

- Approved vendor list and map
- Primary and backup comms (2013 Boston Marathon lost all cell signal)
- Teams and positioning, with rotation time
- Clear & Simple Mission – “We protect the public from Active Killer”
- Visual Classification – event staff, LEO, employee, wrist bands
- Threat Assessment Team – On site commander contact, Local/Sheriff contact, NYSP contact, FBI contact
- A record of all incoming threats (phone or social media) before and during
- Concentric layers of security with each layer having elements in place to deter, detect, and delay the threat
- Camera monitoring with control center

#### Gates:

- Create clear expectation of bag inspection- signs, tables, flashlights
- Unusual items in bag – watches/timers, multiple cell phones or drop phones, 9 volt batteries, wire, uncommon maps or hand made maps, outdated or out of place devices, uneven weight to an Ipad or Notebook, R/C devices/transmitters.
- Unusually bulky shaped bag/clothing

**\*\*Information also provided by DHS/TSA, Behavior Detection**

#### Environment:

- Time of day & Weather – what is normal behavior and attire?
- Public demeanor – Unhappy, alone, overly observant, multiple sightings in same location, surveillance of LEO, unusual video or photography choices
- Public Appearance – Not engaged in the activity that a normal patron would be engaged in, even doing opposite of crowd.
- Physical Layout – What are vulnerability areas, bottleneck points, imagine attack scenario

#### Indicators:

- Exposed switch and/or wires not assoc w/earphones.
- Facial expressions – emotionless, focused stare on one point
- Clothing not appropriate to weather
- Bulky clothing
- Unusually heavy backpack
- Alone
- Enter as two, but then separate

**Note:** There may be a legitimate and lawful reason why these indicators are observed. Some of the activities, taken individually, could be innocent. We are asking you to determine when that is *not* the case so that the circumstances may be examined by law enforcement professionals in a larger context to determine whether there is a basis to investigate. The activities outlined on this handout are by no means all-inclusive but have been compiled from a review of terrorist events over several years. *It is important to remember that just because someone's speech, actions, beliefs, appearance, or way of life is different, it does not mean that he or she is suspicious.*

## What Should I Do?

If you're in, be all in and work the mission.

- ✓ Approach people who indicate w/suspicious activity, and engage them in conversation. Technique of open ended questioning to get to an answer without giving them the answer in your question. You are allowed to question further, if needed.
- ✓ Promptly report any potential threat (person or package). Tier reporting: Further observation up to Threat Assessment
- ✓ Talk to customers, ask questions, and listen to and observe their responses.
- ✓ Unattended bags of High concern – Scan area to see unusual interest, referring back to your environmental baseline.
- ✓ Know the contact for on duty bomb dog and don't hesitate to utilize this asset.
- ✓ Make note of suspicious statements, people, and/or vehicles.

Do not jeopardize your safety or the safety of others.

**FBI Buffalo Division**  
**Joint Terrorism Task Force**  
**(716) 856-7800**

This document, or any segment thereof, may not be rewritten, posted on the internet, or given to any other public or private entity without prior written or verbal approval from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.



# LAST SLIDE....

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